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Importance 
Hendra virus infection is an emerging viral disease of horses and humans in 
Australia. Although this disease is uncommon, cases in horses have been reported with 
increasing frequency since it was first recognized in 1994. Hendra virus is maintained in 
asymptomatic flying foxes (pteropid fruit bats). Virus shedding from these bats appears 
to increase at unpredictable intervals, leading to spillover events that transmit Hendra 
virus to horses. Infected horses usually experience a brief, severe respiratory or 
neurological illness with a high case fatality rate, and are thought to be incidental hosts. 
Horse-to-horse transmission seems to be rare among animals kept on pastures, although 
infected horses brought into stables have spread the virus to a few animals in close 
contact. In some incidents, Hendra virus spread from horses to humans during close 
contact; human infections from other sources, including direct contact with flying foxes, 
have not been reported. Four of the seven clinical cases in humans were fatal. Other 
species may also be susceptible to Hendra virus. Infections without clinical signs have 
been reported rarely in dogs exposed to infected horses, and additional species, 
including cats, pigs, ferrets and pocket pets (hamsters, guinea pigs), can be infected 
experimentally. A vaccine was recently introduced for horses, but no vaccine or specific 
antiviral treatment has been found yet for humans. Uncertainty about the ability of 
Hendra virus to persist long-term has resulted in the euthanasia of infected horses and 
dogs in Australia even when the illness was not fatal. 
Etiology 
Hendra virus (HeV) is a member of the genus Henipavirus in the family 
Paramyxoviridae. This genus also includes Nipah virus, Cedar virus (an apparently 
nonpathogenic virus found in Australian bats) and additional uncharacterized 
henipaviruses in various locations. Multiple Hendra virus variants circulate in bats. 
Whether these viruses differ in virulence for other animals is unknown; however, 
several variants have been found in clinical cases in horses and humans. 
Species Affected 
Bats of the genus Pteropus (pteropid fruit bats/ flying foxes) appear to be the 
reservoir hosts. Hendra virus has been detected in all four species of Australian flying 
foxes: Pteropus alecto, P. poliocephalus, P. scapulatus and Pteropus conspicillatus. 
However, P. alecto and P. conspicillatus seem to be infected and/or shed virus more 
often than P. poliocephalus or P. scapulatus.  
Other mammals are thought to be incidental hosts. All clinical cases in animals, 
to date, have occurred in horses, but other species may also be susceptible. In an early 
experimental study, Hendra virus was pathogenic in cats and guinea pigs, but mice, 
rats, two dogs, rabbits and chickens did not develop clinical signs. Definitive 
seroconversion was only observed in the rabbits in this study, although one dog and 
three of four rats had equivocal neutralizing titers. However, naturally acquired 
subclinical infections were later detected in two dogs on properties with sick horses, 
and an unpublished study has confirmed that dogs can be experimentally infected 
without clinical signs. Aged (one-year-old) mice are now known to be susceptible to 
intranasal inoculation, and develop clinical signs. Other species that have been 
experimentally infected with Hendra virus include pigs, ferrets, guinea pigs, hamsters 
and African green monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops). As of 2015, naturally acquired 
infections have not been reported in any species other than horses and dogs.  
Zoonotic potential 
Humans are susceptible to Hendra virus. To date, all clinical cases have been 
acquired during close contact with infected horses and/or their tissues. Necropsies are 
a particularly high-risk procedure, but any contact with blood, secretions or tissues 
also carries a risk. At least one case is thought to have resulted from contact with 
nasal fluids from an asymptomatic horse (while performing nasal cavity lavage for 
another condition) during the incubation period. No one has apparently been infected 
by direct or indirect exposure to infected flying foxes, and surveys have found no 
evidence of Hendra virus infections among people who care for these animals. 
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Geographic Distribution 
Hendra virus infections have been seen only in 
Australia, where this virus is endemic in flying foxes. 
Seropositive flying foxes have been found from Darwin in 
north central Australia to Melbourne in southeastern 
Australia. Cases in horses have only been reported from 
eastern Australia, in the states of Queensland and New 
South Wales. Antibodies detected in flying foxes in Papua 
New Guinea might be caused by Hendra virus or a related 
virus. 
Currently there is no evidence that Hendra virus exists 
in other areas. However, henipaviruses or antibodies to 
these viruses have been detected in bats on several 
continents. Most of these viruses are poorly characterized. 
Transmission 
In flying foxes, infectious virus and/or viral nucleic 
acids have been found in urine, blood, throat swabs, saliva, 
feces, fetal tissues and uterine fluids. Urine is currently 
thought to be the most important source of this virus, with 
other secretions and excretions (e.g., feces, nasal and oral 
secretions) probably less significant in transmission. Virus 
prevalence appears to wax and wane in bat populations, 
with periodic pulses of high virus shedding in bat urine. 
One such pulse lasted for 2-3 months. Vertical transmission 
has been demonstrated, although a recent survey of 
archived flying fox tissues suggests that it might not be 
common. Whether Hendra virus persists in local 
populations of flying foxes (with periodic recrudescence), is 
transmitted between groups, or is maintained by some 
combination of these processes is uncertain. 
Horses are thought to become infected by ingesting or 
inhaling Hendra virus from the environment, most likely 
when they feed in areas contaminated by flying fox urine 
and/or virus-contaminated fruits and spats (fibrous plant 
material that remains after chewing by bats). The index case 
is usually a horse kept outside, near flying fox activity. 
Hendra virus does not appear to be highly contagious 
among horses, and close contact seems to be necessary for 
it to spread. Infected horses on pastures have rarely 
transmitted the virus to their companions. In two outbreaks, 
however, infected animals in stables spread the virus to 
several contacts. In horses, there is evidence for Hendra 
virus shedding in nasal and oral secretions, urine, feces, 
blood and a wide variety of tissues, although the presence 
of infectious virus has not been confirmed in all 
secretions/excretions (some investigations only detected 
viral nucleic acids). Hendra virus appears to be widespread 
in the body by the time clinical signs appear, and it has 
been found in nasal secretions before the onset of clinical 
signs. Whether horses can remain persistently infected after 
recovery from clinical signs is currently uncertain. 
There is limited information about Hendra virus 
infections in other animals, but several species are 
susceptible to experimental inoculation by the intranasal or 
oronasal routes. Cats could be infected intranasally, orally 
and by subcutaneous inoculation. How two dogs became 
infected under natural conditions is unclear, but both lived 
on properties with infected horses, and one dog had 
probably had been exposed to the blood of a sick horse. 
Viral nucleic acids were detected in the blood and tissues of 
one naturally infected pet dog, although this animal did not 
transmit the virus to people or to two other dogs on the 
property. Some experimentally infected dogs shed 
infectious virus for a short time in respiratory secretions. 
Experimentally infected cats were able to transmit Hendra 
virus to other cats or horses in close contact. In this 
experiment, the virus was detected in feline urine, but not in 
nasal secretions, oral secretions or feces. In experimentally 
infected pigs, Hendra virus was found primarily in the 
respiratory tract; pigs shed infectious virus in oral and nasal 
secretions and feces, and viral RNA was also detected in 
ocular secretions, but there was no evidence of virus 
excretion in the urine.  
Humans have been infected during close contact with 
sick horses and during necropsies, probably via body fluids 
or aerosols. Person-to-person transmission has not been 
seen, but Hendra virus has been isolated from 
nasopharyngeal secretions and the kidneys, and detected by 
PCR in patients’ urine. The virus may be shed for several 
weeks in acute cases. One person developed Hendra virus-
associated neurological signs a year after infection, raising 
the possibility that this virus might persist in some body 
site(s) after recovery. A recent study found no evidence of 
long-term virus persistence in two survivors. 
Transmission may be possible on fomites, particularly 
in closed environments such as stables. Under optimal 
laboratory conditions, Hendra virus survived for more than 
four days in flying fox urine at 22°C (72°F). This virus can 
also remain viable for a few hours to a few days (generally 
less than four days) in fruit juice or fruit. It does not survive 
well at higher temperatures, and it is inactivated in less then 
a day in either urine or fruit juice at 37°C (98.6°F). In one 
study, the half-life of this virus in cell culture medium was 
approximately 13 days at 4°C, 2 days at 22°C and 2 
minutes at 56°C.  
Disinfection 
Like other paramyxoviruses, Hendra virus is expected 
to be susceptible to soaps, detergents and many common 
disinfectants including hypochlorite, iodophors, 
biguanidines (e.g. chlorhexidine), Virkon® and quaternary 
ammonium compounds. This virus is susceptible to 
desiccation or heat, but resists inactivation by acids or 
alkalis; it can survive a wide pH range from 4 to 11.  
Infections in Animals 
Incubation Period 
In horses, the incubation period ranged from 3 to 16 
days, and was slightly longer in natural cases (5-16 days) 
Hendra Virus Infection 
Last Updated: December 2015 © 2009-2015 page 3 of 9 
than in experimentally infected animals. The incubation 
period in experimentally infected cats was 4 to 8 days. 
Clinical Signs 
Horses 
Two syndromes, one characterized primarily by 
respiratory disease and the other mainly by neurological 
signs, have been reported in horses. Because Hendra virus 
causes vasculitis, other presentations might also be 
possible. Most known cases have been severe and acute, 
and progressed rapidly to death within days. A few infected 
horses were found dead, with no apparent signs of illness 
when they were last observed 12-24 hours earlier. Milder 
cases have also been seen, and a few horses recovered.  
Nonspecific clinical signs, such as fever, anorexia and 
depression, were seen initially in experimentally infected 
horses. Fever and an elevated heart rate appeared to be the 
earliest signs in these animals. Apparent discomfort was 
also seen in some animals, which shifted their weight 
constantly from leg to leg, or alternated weight shifting with 
a rigid stance. Some experimentally infected horses had a 
slight nasal discharge early, became agitated or irritable, or 
developed respiratory signs before euthanasia, and one 
animal passed small amounts of blood and mucus in the 
feces. Nonspecific signs reported in naturally infected 
animals have included high fever, anorexia, depression, 
sweating and uneasiness. 
In horses with respiratory signs, the respiration tends to 
be rapid, shallow and labored, and the mucus membranes 
may be congested. Jaundiced mucus membranes, ataxia, 
mild neurological signs or subcutaneous edema (e.g., facial 
edema or swelling of the lips) have also been seen. Just 
before death, animals may develop a copious nasal 
discharge, which becomes frothy and may be bloodstained. 
The clinical course is acute; death usually occurs one to 
three days after the initial signs. Some convalescent horses 
may develop neurological signs, but others seem to recover 
fully. 
In other horses, neurological rather than respiratory 
signs have predominated. Some CNS signs reported in 
Hendra virus-infected horses have included an altered gait 
(e.g. high stepping), a “wobbly gait” that progresses to 
ataxia, altered consciousness or aimless walking, apparent 
blindness in one or both eyes, a head tilt, circling, muscle 
twitches or tremors, facial paralysis, a locked jaw, spasms 
of the jaw and involuntary chomping. Several horses have 
been found caught in fences, presumably as the result of 
neurological deficits, and were initially thought to have 
died as a result of accidents unrelated to Hendra virus 
infection. 
Other reported clinical signs have included muscle 
tremors, colic and straining to defecate, foul odor to the 
breath, excessively warm hooves and delayed blood clotting 
times. Some horses have had difficulty urinating or dribbled 
urine in the terminal stages.  
Other species 
No clinical signs have been reported in naturally or 
experimentally infected dogs, with the possible exception of 
an episode of apparent discomfort in one animal. Despite 
the absence of clinical signs, this naturally infected dog had 
lesions at necropsy. The other naturally infected dog 
seroconverted with no evidence of virus replication. In 
experimentally infected cats, fever and increased 
respiratory rates were followed by severe illness and death 
within 24 hours. Experimentally infected pigs developed 
fever and depression. Some pigs also had respiratory signs 
(cough, respiratory distress), which were fatal in one severe 
case. One pig developed both respiratory signs and mild 
neurological signs, but recovered. Severe respiratory 
disease was seen in experimentally infected African green 
monkeys, while ferrets had a nonfatal illness with signs of 
fever, depression and generalized tremors. Some guinea 
pigs developed generalized, fatal vascular disease, with few 
clinical signs before death, while others had nonspecific 
signs (depression, anorexia) and recovered. Syrian golden 
hamsters (Mesocricetus auratus) had either fatal respiratory 
signs, or respiratory signs followed by neurological signs. 
Fatal illness with neurological signs (ataxia, muscle 
tremors) was also seen in one-year-old (aged) mice, while 
2-month-old mice were resistant. 
Flying foxes (including pregnant animals) appear to 
remain asymptomatic, and all infected animals may not 
seroconvert.  
Post Mortem Lesions      Click to view images 
Necropsies have been linked to human cases, and 
should be performed only if they can be carried out 
safely, using recommended PPE and other precautions. 
Routine necropsy precautions may not be sufficient to 
protect people.  
Horses 
In horses with the respiratory syndrome, post–mortem 
lesions have been found mainly in the lower respiratory 
tract. Common lesions include marked pulmonary edema, 
dilation of the pulmonary lymphatics, and congestion and 
ventral consolidation of the lungs. Petechial hemorrhages 
have been seen on the pleural surfaces, and patchy 
hemorrhages may be found in the lung parenchyma. The 
airway often contains white or blood–tinged foam, and 
edema fluid oozes from cut tissues. Swollen and congested 
lymph nodes (especially lymph nodes associated with the 
respiratory tract), pleural and pericardial fluid, and visceral 
edema have also been reported. Scattered petechiae and 
ecchymoses may be found in the stomach, intestines and 
perirenal tissues. Yellowing of the subcutaneous tissue was 
reported to be common in some reports. Endometrial edema 
and purplish discoloration of the serosa of the uterus was 
reported in one experimentally infected mare. Vasculitis is 
the predominant lesion on histopathology. 
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Other animals 
Post mortem lesions reported in a naturally infected, 
asymptomatic dog included respiratory lesions (diffuse 
reddening of the lungs, frothy fluid in the trachea and 
bronchi), enlargement and reddening of respiratory-
associated lymph nodes, reddening of the tonsils, an 
enlarged liver and spleen, and prominent white streaks at 
the corticomedullary junction of the kidney. Severe 
pulmonary edema, hydrothorax and edematous bronchial 
lymph nodes were seen in experimentally infected cats. 
Some experimentally infected pigs had areas of 
consolidation in the lungs, with or without petechiae or 
larger, demarcated hemorrhagic areas. Petechial 
hemorrhages were also reported in other organs of some 
pigs, including the kidneys, bronchial and submandibular 
lymph nodes. Lesions found in experimentally infected 
ferrets included subcutaneous edema, petechial 
hemorrhages throughout the skin, the pulmonary 
parenchyma and the abdomen, and enlarged and 
hemorrhagic lymph nodes. 
Diagnostic Tests 
Stringent precautions should be used when 
collecting and shipping any diagnostic samples from live 
or dead animals. Only those samples that can be 
collected safely should be taken. A description of the 
limited necropsy procedure used to collect diagnostic 
samples, as well as necropsy and sample collection 
recommendations, can be found on the Web sites 
maintained by some states in Australia (see Internet 
Resources). 
Sampling a variety of sites increases the probability of 
detecting Hendra virus. A combination of blood and nasal, 
oral and rectal swabs for PCR and/or virus isolation, and 
serum for serology, can detect a high proportion of 
infections in live horses. Other samples that may be taken 
include urine (e.g., a urine soaked swab taken from the 
ground immediately after urination), conjunctival swabs 
and swabs of other orifices (vaginal, urethral). Similar swab 
samples have been recommended for dead horses, together 
with blood collected from the jugular vein, and sampling of 
the superficial submandibular lymph node. Additional 
tissue samples (e.g., lung, kidney, lymphoid tissues, brain) 
may be collected by people experienced in sampling for 
Hendra virus.  
PCR on blood, secretions and excretions (swabs) or 
tissue samples is often used for rapid diagnosis. Virus 
isolation can also be attempted in live animals; however, 
Hendra virus is more likely to be recovered from the tissues 
after death. Because this virus is a biosafety level 4 (BSL4) 
pathogen, virus isolation can only be done in a limited 
number of laboratories. Vero cells are often employed, but 
a number of other cell lines or primary cultures can also be 
used. The isolated virus can be identified by methods such 
as immunostaining or virus neutralization. Electron or 
immunoelectron microscopy may also be helpful. 
Molecular methods (e.g., PCR), comparative 
immunostaining or differential neutralization assays can 
distinguish the closely related Hendra and Nipah viruses. 
Viral antigens can also be detected directly in tissues by 
immunoperoxidase or immunofluorescence assays. 
Serology can be helpful, but horses may not have 
detectable titers until 10 to 14 days after infection. ELISAs 
and serum neutralization tests are used most often; the latter 
is considered to be the gold standard serological assay. 
False positives are common in ELISAs, which are often 
used as an initial screening test. Indirect 
immunofluorescence and immunoblotting have also been 
described. Cross-reactions can occur between Hendra and 
Nipah viruses in serological assays including virus 
neutralization; however, these reactions can be 
distinguished with comparative neutralization tests. 
Currently, there is no commercially validated test that can 
distinguish whether antibodies have resulted from infection 
or vaccination, but an experimental assay is reported to be 
available in Australia. 
There is limited experience with diagnosis in animals 
other than horses. One naturally infected dog seroconverted 
without any virological evidence of infection. In another 
dog, PCR detected viral nucleic acids in blood and tissues, 
but not oral swabs, and virus isolation was unsuccessful. 
This animal was weakly seropositive at the time of 
euthanasia.  
Treatment 
Other than supportive therapy, there is no treatment for 
Hendra virus infections in animals. The current Australian 
policy is to euthanize surviving horses due to uncertainties 
about virus persistence. Infected dogs have also been 
euthanized for the same reason. 
Control 
Disease reporting 
A quick response helps reduce human and animal 
exposure to infected horses, and also decreases the risk of a 
wider outbreak. Veterinarians who encounter or suspect a 
Hendra virus infection should follow their national and/or 
local guidelines for disease reporting. In the U.S., state or 
federal veterinary authorities should be informed 
immediately. As of 2015, Australia also requires immediate 
notification of any infections in domesticated animals, 
although the virus is endemic in bats. 
Prevention 
A Hendra virus vaccine is now available for horses in 
Australia. Exposure to flying foxes, their tissues and 
secretions should also be minimized. Horse paddocks 
should not contain food trees favored by flying foxes, or 
trees planted in configurations that encourage roosting, and 
horses should be kept away from areas where flying foxes 
roost or are feeding. Whenever possible, feed bins and 
water troughs should be covered. Moving horses into 
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stables or other enclosures designed to keep them away 
from flying foxes at night is expected to be helpful.  
Horses that develop signs consistent with Hendra virus 
infection should be isolated; they should not be allowed to 
contact other domesticated animals, as well as other horses. 
Stringent infection control measures should be employed to 
avoid spreading the virus on fomites. Human exposure must 
also be minimized. In Australia, unvaccinated horses that 
may have been exposed are assessed and tested for the 
disease, and vaccination may be recommended. Authorities 
may also require that any companion animals (e.g., dogs 
and cats) exposed to an infected horse be isolated for a 
period. Quarantines and rigorous hygiene have been 
effective in containing past outbreaks. The low rate of 
horse-to-horse transmission also aids control. 
Carcasses should also be isolated until Hendra virus 
infection can be ruled out. Necropsies should be avoided 
unless the operator can carry them out safely using 
recommended guidelines and PPE (see human Prevention 
section). Government authorities should be consulted for 
the most appropriate disposal method for carcasses; deep 
burial on the property is currently considered the option of 
choice, although other options such as burning may also be 
used. 
Morbidity and Mortality 
The prevalence and shedding of Hendra virus seems to 
wax and wane in flying fox populations, but what causes 
these fluctuations is not known. Pregnancy, the birthing 
period and/or lactation were associated with Hendra virus 
infections in some studies, but not others, and their 
influence is currently uncertain. Other factors, such as 
nutritional stress, could also be involved, while 
environmental conditions such as the temperature might 
influence virus survival and transmission to horses. While 
Hendra virus can be shed year-round (though not 
constantly) in flying fox populations, infections appear to 
be seasonal in horses. Equine cases have occurred in the 
cooler months from May to October in subtropical areas, 
with a peak in July, although they have been seen year-
round in the northern tropics.  
Hendra virus infections seem to be uncommon in 
horses. As of July 2015, 94 cases had been reported in this 
species. The first cases were recognized during outbreaks in 
Hendra, Australia (Queensland) in 1994, but infections 
were rarely reported during the following decade; infected 
horses were found once in 1999, and on two occasions in 
2004. The absence of any seropositive horses in two 
surveys, which tested approximately 4000 horses, also 
suggested that infections were rare. Hendra virus infections 
appeared more regularly between 2006 and 2009, with two 
incidents reported each year, and unexpectedly high 
numbers of cases were reported in 2011 (18 incidents with 
23 cases) and 2012-2013 (12 incidents between January 
2012 and July 2013). The reason for the recent increase in 
cases is unclear, although increased testing and recognition 
might play some role. The case fatality rate in recognized 
cases has been high and can approach 90%.  
Other than in horses, the only naturally occurring 
infections that have been recognized (as of December 2015) 
were in two dogs on farms that had infected horses. In one 
of these incidents, only one of the three dogs on the farm 
became infected. In spite of their susceptibility to 
experimental infections, testing of cats on infected farms 
has revealed no natural infections in this species. A survey 
conducted in the Brisbane area, where the initial cases were 
reported in horses, also found no serological evidence of 
henipavirus infections in 500 cats. Likewise, an early 
survey reported that none of 100 swine herds tested in 
Queensland, Australia had antibodies to Hendra virus. 
Experimental infections in cats and guinea pigs have been 
fatal, but no clinical signs have yet been reported in 
naturally or experimentally infected dogs, and ferrets 
became ill but did not die. 
Infections in Humans 
Incubation Period 
The initial symptoms occurred 5 to 16 days after 
exposure in six of the seven human cases. One person 
became ill after 21 days; however, he had been treated 
prophylactically with antiviral drugs, and developed 
encephalitis immediately afterward. It is possible that the 
treatment masked any initial influenza-like signs in this 
case. One person developed recurrent, fatal encephalitis a 
year after apparent recovery from the initial illness.  
Clinical Signs 
Hendra virus infections have been reported in seven 
people. The syndromes have included influenza-like illness, 
multiorgan failure and progressive encephalitis. The two 
initial cases were characterized by a serious influenza-like 
disease with fever, myalgia, respiratory signs and vertigo. 
One person died with pneumonitis, multiorgan failure and 
arterial thrombosis; the other recovered over the next six 
weeks. In the third case, a mild meningoencephalitic illness 
(drowsiness, headache, vomiting, neck stiffness) was 
followed by a long asymptomatic period before fatal 
encephalitis developed a year later. The fourth person 
reported a self-limited influenza-like illness with a dry 
cough, sore throat, cervical lymphadenopathy, fatigue, body 
aches and a fever that lasted for approximately one week. 
Two cases in 2008-2009 were characterized by a 
biphasic illness that began with influenza-like signs (fever, 
myalgia and headache), followed by apparent recovery, 
then by recurrent fever and signs of encephalitis after 5-12 
days. In one case, the neurological signs were limited to 
ataxia, mild confusion, bilateral ptosis and dysarthria, and 
the person survived, although with persistent neurological 
defects. The other person developed progressive, fatal 
neurological signs, beginning with ptosis, ataxia and mild 
confusion and progressing to seizures and coma. Another 
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fatal case occurred in a person who had been treated 
prophylactically for 5 days with antiviral drugs after 
exposure. He developed encephalitis, with signs of ataxia, 
drowsiness and seizures, immediately after drug treatment, 
and died after 19 days. 
Diagnostic Tests 
Hendra virus infections in humans have been 
diagnosed similarly to cases in horses, i.e., by tests such as 
PCR, virus isolation, antigen detection and 
immunohistochemistry. 
Treatment 
Treatment of Hendra virus infections, to date, has 
mainly been supportive. Antiviral drugs have been 
administered to some patients, as well as prophylactically in 
people at high risk of exposure; however, no antivirals have 
yet been shown to be effective against this disease. The 
efficacy of passively administered immunotherapy 
(monoclonal antibodies against Hendra virus) is under 
investigation. 
Control 
Disease reporting 
People who have been exposed to Hendra virus should 
seek medical advice. In Australia, the area health 
department should be contacted to report the case.  
Prevention 
Human infections have been reported after nursing or 
examining sick horses, or handling equine tissues at 
necropsy. Stringent precautions should be taken to prevent 
contact with blood, tissues, body fluids and excretions 
whenever Hendra virus is among the differential diagnoses. 
Personal protective equipment (PPE) recommendations are 
available from government sources in Australia (see 
Internet Resources). In general, the minimum 
recommendations during an investigation of a suspected 
case include impervious gloves, a particulate (P2 [N95] or 
higher) respirator, a face shield or safety eyewear to protect 
the eyes, splash-proof overalls (or cotton or disposable 
overalls with impervious or splash-proof apron) and 
impervious boots. [NB: splash-proof rather than impervious 
overalls are recommended in Australia, due to dangers from 
overheating in a hot climate] Excellent hygiene should be 
practiced at all times, and caution should be used to avoid 
generating aerosols or splashing material, both when 
examining the horse and during disinfection. Detailed 
recommendations for conducting investigations of 
suspected Hendra virus infections, as well as precautions to 
be used when the likelihood of Hendra virus is first 
revealed during an examination of the case, are available 
from authorities in Australia.  
Because Hendra virus infections can look like other 
diseases and are often diagnosed retrospectively, good 
infection control precautions (standard precautions) should 
be used routinely with horses whenever there is a risk of 
contact with blood, body fluids, excretions, mucous 
membranes or breaks in the skin. Veterinarians in endemic 
areas should keep a dedicated Hendra virus field kit with 
appropriate PPE, disinfectants, waste disposal bags and 
other necessary items for use in unexpected cases. All 
human exposure should be minimized once the case is 
suspected, and any contamination should be washed off 
with soap and water. Investigations should be continued 
only if suitable precautions can be taken and PPE is 
available.  
Morbidity and Mortality 
Hendra virus infections have been reported in seven 
people, all of whom had close contact with infected horses 
during their illness or at necropsy. Only a percentage of 
those exposed to infected horses have become ill. Two 
people, a stablehand and the trainer, were infected during 
an outbreak in 1994; the stablehand recovered but the 
trainer died. In a separate episode, a farmer who had close 
contact with two sick horses (both during their illness and at 
necropsy) became infected and died of the illness a year 
later. In 2004, a veterinarian who conducted the necropsy 
on an infected horse became ill but recovered. Two 
assistants at the necropsy remained seronegative. The same 
year, eighteen people were exposed to another infected 
horse or to its tissues at necropsy, but none seroconverted. 
No human infections were associated with the horses that 
died of this disease in 1999, 2006 or 2007, but illness was 
reported in a veterinarian and an animal nurse during one of 
the two clusters in 2008. A veterinarian was also infected 
during an outbreak in 2009. Two of the latter cases were 
fatal. Although there have been a number of people exposed 
to equine cases since that time (e.g., more than 60 people 
exposed to equine cases in 2011), no additional human 
cases were reported between 2010 and 2015. There has 
been no evidence of seroconversion in people who are often 
in close contact with flying foxes. 
Internet Resources 
Australian Veterinary Association (AVA). Appropriate PPE 
for Hendra virus investigation (video) 
http://www.ava.com.au 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, United States  
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/hendra/  
New South Wales Department of Primary Industries. 
Hendra Virus (includes guidelines for veterinarians 
handling cases) 
http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/agriculture/livestock/horses
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